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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ANDREW G. NOKES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.CO~TINENTAL

:MINING & MILLING CO., a Corporation, E. G. FRAWLEY, President, JOHN DOE, Secretary, GLEN I. CRANDALL, Transfer Agent,

Case No. 8501

Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTH

STATEMENT OF TI-IE FACTS
This is an action to compel the defendant corporation, its officers or Transfer Agent to transfer a certificate of stock on the books of the corporation. The
certificate in que·stion represented 100,000 shares of the
common stock of the defendant Continental Mining and
:Milling Company, a Nevada corporation. The certificate
was made in the names of Lawrence & l\1ario 0. l\1igliac-
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cio (Plaintiff'·s Ex. 1, R. 29), and, being promotion stock,
was deposited in 1950 with the Utah Securities Commission. The stock was released at the request of the plaintiff and over the objection of the defendant corporation
by the Utah Commission on the 7th day of June, 1954
(R. 51). The transfer of the stock was arranged for the
specific purpose of defeating the corporation's rights
and under such circumstances that dispel any notion of
a transfer in good faith. The defendant corporation and
defendant E. G. Frawley take this appeal.
The sale of the stock was arranged by Thomas C.
Cuthbert and John "\V. Lowe, attorneys licensed to practice before the Bar of this State (R. 46, 51). They were
and now are the attorneys for the 1\:ligliaccios and had
previously represented them in prolonged litigation
against the defendant corporation and the defendant
Frawley (R. 49). Cuthbert and Lowe were also close personal friends of the plaintiff to the extent that all considered a relationship of trust and confidence existed
among them (R. -±-!,51).

On the 7th of June, the date the rtah Commission
released the certificate to the Migliaccios, Cuthbert and
Lowe were present and represented Migliaccio, and had
personal knowledge of the corporation's claim and all of
the circtunstances surrounding the disputed stock and
were 'advised ·that the corporation intended to institute
an action to recover the certificate (R. 46, 51, 53). On
the 11th day of June, four days later and five days prior
to the sale to the plaintiff, the defendant corporation
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filed a complaint in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah, Central Division, wherein it claimed
to be the owner of S'aid stock (Ex. 3, R. 42). 1vfr. Lowe
knew that the action had been commenced (R. 53).
The sale of the stock was arranged on the 16th day
of June, 1954, by a series of coincidences. On that day
the plaintiff, a resident of I\::ansas, as good fortune
would have it, was in the offices of Cuthbert and Lowe,
apparently upon business for his former employer,
Pioneer Pipe Line Company, which co:rnpany Cuthbert
and Lowe represented (R. 34-35). Mr. Nokes had gone
to law school with Cuthbert where their friendship began, .and on the 16th day of June, 1954, Mr. Nokes was
an attorney licensed to practice in the State of Utah
(R. 36, 44). He was employed, however, at that tirne by
the Sinclair Pipe Line Company for a salary of about
$500.00 per month (R. 42). Cuthbert knew Nokes was
a novice and lacking in any knowledge about uraniun1
stock (R. 45), except that he had heard there was money
to be made in uranium stock (R. 35).
vVhile the record discloses that Nokes was in tho
office on matters relating to litigation involving the
Pioneer Pipe Line Company, it does not appear that .any
business was discussed except the sale of the stock. The
suggestion that Nokes buy the stock and the price at
which it could be purchased was made by Cuthbert and
Lowe (R. 35-37). The benefits and the speculative possibilities of the stock were discussed in detail (R. 38-45).
As coincidence would have it Nokes was receptive to a
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speculation and had $500.00 with which to indulge his
n1ood (R. 35). Notwithstanding the fact that the stock
was not traded, had no market value and required Noke~
to part with an entire rnonth's salary, there was absolutely no sales resistance (R. 38-45). The conversations
were held in Mr. Lowe~s office while all three were present and their very good friend and fellow member at
the Bar was induced to purchase the stock upon the representation that it had a book value of $7000.00 (R. 45).
In view of the extemporaneous nature of the conversations about stock a further remarkable coincidence
was at hand. The ~ligliaccios were residents of Price
and, in spi1e of the fact that it took a "Gnited States
Marshal from the 11th day of June u~til the 19th day of
July to discover the whereabouts of ~Ir. and Mrs. :Jiigliaccio, .Jir. Cuthbert, hy means of a single telephone call,
located Migliaccio in the ~ltlas Building in Salt L.ake
City (R. 38-48). At this point favorable circumstances
continued. Rather than call his client from Lowe's office by merely reaching out and picking up the telephone,
.Jlr. Cuthbert left ~Ir. Lowe's office and, in the seclusion
of his own office, had the following conversation with
Migliaccio :
·· 'So I called l\Iagliaccio on the telephone
thereafter and told him that if he wanted 1noney
I could get him $500.00 for this stock.
M~agliaeeio
de~al

said: 'Do you think it is a good

?'

I told hun we knew he had been fighting it
out with Frawley sinee about 1950, that it was a
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sure bet he wouldn't be ~able to do anything with
that stock without liti~ation. If he sold the stock
off maybe somebody else could do something with
it without fighting it. So I told him on that basis
it would be a good deal to get out of it because lawsuits would be costing more than the stock was
worth.' " (R. 48).
Upon con1pleting the conversation with Migliaccio
Cuthbert returned to lvir. Lowe's office (R. 48). GooJ
fortune continued on behalf of their very good friend Mr.
Kokes because he w.as informed by Mr. Cuthbert that
the S'ale had been arranged. Another remarkable circumstance then occurred. Mr. Cuthbert forgot to tell his
very good friend all of the conversation he had with
Migliaccio (R. 48).
In about an hour's time all of these Inatters occurred
.and Nokes hurried to 1neet :Migliaccio, turn over to him
a month's salary, before deductions, and went to an of
fice of the defendant Frawley to demand transfer (R.
39). At this point the course of things changed. Fron1
the facts it can hardly be said that the change was unexp~cted. On seeing :Mr. Frawley, Nokes' good fortune
began to frown because, as he testified: "After he belabored me with invective he told 1ne he would not tranf-,fer the shares." (R. 40). Nokes then hurried back to
the office of Cuthbert and Lowe and told them of the
turn of events (R. 39). Thus, two hours after they had
made their good friend $7000.00 on a $500.00 inveshnent,
on stnck that wa(S not traded and was not worth the price
of a lawsuit, Cuthbert and Lowe told Nokes that the defendant corporation claimed the stock (R. 41-48).
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Fortune continued to frown on Mr. Nokes because
his request that his friends represent him in the matter
was refused (R. 50).
The defendant corporation thereafter continued to
assert its rights and following the trial of the action filed
in the Federal Court, Judge A. Sherman Christenson,
on the 14th day of April, 1955, adjudicated that the corporation was the owner of the stock. (Ex. 4, R. 42).
The record discloses that the only demand for transfer made was on ~Ir. Frawley. It does not show that the
demand was made in the office of the Continental :Mining
and 1\iilling Company or that the stock was sent to the
Transfer Agent of the corporation for transfer (R. 31).
The defendants contend that the plaintiff acquired
nothing by the endorsement and, in any event, the plaintiff had notice of the defect and claim of the defendant
corporation and that the sale was not n1ade in good
faith.
STATE1\IENT OF POIXTS

POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE ADJUDICATION THAT
THE CORPORATION \VAS THE OWNER AND DEFENDANTS' PREDE·CESSORS HAD NO RIGHT. TITLE OR I~
TEREST IN THE STOCK.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
DEFECT IN TITLE OF THE STOCK OR THAT THE SALE
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IMPUTE
NOTI·CE OF THE DEFECT.
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POINT III.
THE SALE WAS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

POINT IV.
THAT BY STATUTE THE TRANSFER WAS NOT VALID
AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION UNTIL IT WAS REGISTERED UPON THE BOOKS OF THE CORPORATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS BOUND BY THE ADJUDICATION THAT
THE CORPORATION WAS THE OWNER AND DEFENDANTS' PREDECESSORS HAD NO RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST IN THE STOCK.

The position of the defendant is that the plaintiff
is bound by the decree in Continental :Mining and :Milling
Company, .a corporation, plaintiff, v. LaY·.Trne~· and
Marie 0. ~iigliaccio, defendants, Civil C-85-54, 1Tnited
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division. In the case referred to the specific question before the court was the title and ownership of the certificate and the stock it represented. The same matter
is directly in question in the present action. In such cases
it has been held that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction is conclusive as between the parties and
those in privity with the1n in estate or law. RluUheu·s
v. Matthews et al., 102 Utah 428, 132 P. 2d 111:
" 'The judgment of a court of concurrent
jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a ple.a,
·a bar, or as evidence, conclusive, between the same
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parties, upon the same maJtter directly in question
in another court.' 15 R.C.L. 951, Sec. 429.
'The foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought
.not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once; that, when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such
trial has been given, the judgment of the court,
so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties, and those in privity with
them in law or estate.

* * * Public policy and the interest of litigants
alike require there be an end to litigation, .and
the peace and order of society demand that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction as to parties and
subject matter shall not be retried between the
same parties in any subsequent suit in any court.'
15 R.C.L. 953, Sec. 430." (Emphasis added).
While the plaintiff was named a party to the action
after the defendant becmne aware of the transfer, he
was never served with process. However, the plaintiff
is in privity with the defendants therein, having succeeded to the s~une property and property rights. This
court defined the word "priYity .. in relation to the doctrine of res judicata in Tauuer l'. Bacon., State Engineer,
et al., 103 Utah 494, 136 P. :2d 957:
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res
judicata does not operate to affect str.angers to
a judgn1ent: that it only affects the parties and
their Rnccessors in interest, and those who are in
privity with a party thereto. 30 Aln. Jur. 951,
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Sec. 220; 34 C. J. 756 to 758, Section 1165; Glen
Allen l\fining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77
Utah 362, .at 367, 296 P. 231; State Bank of Sevier
County v. American Cement & Plaster Co., 80
Utah 250, 10 P. 2d 1065; Tintic Indian Chief
M:ining & Milling Co. v. Clyde, 79 Utah 337, 10
P. 2d 932; Taylor v. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 262
P. 266, 55 A.L.R. 1032; Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah
473, 88 P. 609; 120 Am. St. Rep. 935. This
court has defined the word 'privity' as 'a mutual
or successive relationship to the same right or
property. As .applied to judgments or decrees of
courts, the word means one whose interest has
been legally represented at the time.' Glen Allen
l\1:ining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Cmnpany,
supra (77 Utah 362, 296 P. 233)."
The plaintiff herein could acquire only the title of
his predecessors in interest .and nothing more. The question of title was fully litigated and the plaintiff herein
could offer no matter in support of his transferor's title
nor impose any defense thereto. His interest was legally
represented in the fullest sense of the word. The essential and important element of privity is that one person should succeed to the estate or interest formerly held
by another. The definition of privity and the theory .are
set forth in 1 Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition,
Section 438, pages 959-961, as follows :
"Privies in General. - 'Where one claims in
privity with another, whether by blood, estate, or
law, he is in the same situation with such person
as to any judgment for or against him; for judgments bind privies .as well as parties.' The rule is
well settled and elementary that a judgment is
as conclusive on privies as on the parties themSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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selves. 'The term ' 'privity' ' denotes mutual or
successive relationship to the same rights of property.' This relationship is produced either by
operation of law, by descent, or by voluntary or
involuntary transfers from one person to another.
Hence privies have, from an early period in the
history of the common law, been classified as, -

All privies are in effect, if not in name, privies in estate. They are bound because they have
succeeded to some estate or interest which was
bound in the hands of its former owner; and the
extent of the estoppel, so far as the privy is concerned, is limited to controversies affecting this
estate or interest. The manner in which the estate
was lawfully acquired neither linrits nor extends
the operation of the estoppel created by a former
adjudication, and is therefore immaterial. It is
essential to privity, as the term is here used, that
one person should have succeeded to an estate or
interest forn1erly held by another."
In the case herein Lhe cmnplaint in the rnited States
District Court was filed on the 11th day of June, 195-±,
and the transfer of the stock was on the 16th day of June,
195-!, the defendant :Jligliaccio. however, was not served
until Jnly 19, 195-!. In discussing privity· the sequence
in which tlw ach; occurred are of ilnportanee. It has been
held that when:> the transfer is prior to the conunenceInent of tht> .action there is no privity. but where the
tnm~I'Pr is 1nade subsequent to the emmnencement of
tl1t> adion there is privity and the part~~ is bound by the
;jndgn1ent. The qtwstion as to when the action was comIIH'll<'Pd is also inlportant. The rtah Rules of Civil ProSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cedure provide that an action n1ay be commenced by the
filing of a complaint or by the service of summons. Utah
R~tles of Civil Proced~tre, Rule 3 (.a). The Federal rulA3
provide that an action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 3. The Federal Court action was necessarily commenced by the filing of the complaint and it is that date
which is critical in determining the question of privity
and not the service of process or the date of adjudic.ation. It is interesting to note the comment in 1 Federal
Practice and Procedure, Barron and Holtzoff, Section
161 at page 270 :
"The necessity and importance of the rule is
obvious. The time of commencing the action detennines whether it is prematurely brought or
whether by reason of delay it is barred by limi tations or laches, or which of two eourts first acquired jurisdiclion and therefore should retain
the case for disposition, or in some cases whether
after-accruing claims and defenses may be litigated." (Emphasis added).
The same proposition is stated in 1Freeman on Judgments, Fifth Edition, Section -1--tO at page 966:
"Judgment Against Predecessor After Tr.ansfer. - I t is well understood, however, though not
always so stated in express terms, that no one is
privy to a judgment whose succession to the rights
of property thereby affected, occurred previously
to the institution of the suit. No alienee, grantee,
assignee or mortgagee is bound or affected by a
judgment or decree in a suit commenced by or
against the alienor, grantor, .assignor or mortgagor, subsequent to the alienation, grant, assign-
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ment or mortgage, to which he was not a party.
The critical date in determining the question
of a purchaser's privity is the commencement of
the suit rather than the date of the adjudication,
except that this may be affected by statutes governing lis pendens."
The question is necessarily raised as to what effect
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act has on the question
here involved. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act was not
designed to give a party any greater property rights than
before the passage of the Act. It is merely a procedural
rule affecting the transfer of stock and is principallY
effective between the parties. While the purpose is to
give the stock some of the incidents of negotiability, it
does not go so far as to change a stockholder's relationship with the corporation. The extent of negotiability
and the effect of the Uniforn1 Stock Transfer Act wa~
before the court in [Tntermyer et al. r. State Tax Commission et al., 102 lTtah ~14, 129 P. 2d 881:
.. Counsel argue that since the rnifonn Stock
Transfer Act permits attachment or levy of execution on stock onlv bv seizure of the certificate, the stock or inte~est" of the stockholder in the
corporation does not exist independent of the
certificate. Therefore it can have no situs except
the situs of the certifieate. The certificate thus
actually becomes the }Jroperty, and not the erideuce or proof of ownership thereof. Such is not
the im1wrt of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
It does not clwll.(/C the nature of stock Olcwnerslzip
or stockholders' riphts. as far as the state or the
corporation is concerned. That Act relates solely
to methods of transferriug title to stock either by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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act of the owner, or by legal process. * * * It is
simply a procedural statute dealing with ,the
methods and processes of determining or obtaining title to the stock." (Emphasis added).

The plaintiff, notwithstanding the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, could acquire no greater right nor any
better title than his transferor. "\Vhile the trial court
found that the plaintiff had no knowledge of any infirmity or of any court action involving the action, it did
not specifically find that the plaintiff herein was not in
privity with the defendant in the Federal Court suit.
The question of notice is immaterial if, as defendants
contend herein, the plaintiff was bound as a privy by
the prior judgment.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
DEFECT IN TITLE OF THE STOCK OR THAT THE SALE
WAS MADE UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IMPUTE
NOTICE OF THE DEFECT.

While defendants realize that they are faced with
an adverse finding of fact by the trial court on the question of notice, they take the position that the testimony
of the plaintiff and the witnesses Cuthbert and Lowe
are not worthy of belief. From the decisions heretofore
handed down by this Court it would appear that whether
or not it is to be bound by a finding of fact depends upon
the circumstances of each case, contrary to the oft-stated
rule that a finding wjll not be disturbed if there is any
evidence to support it.
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The factual premise and the circumstances surrounding the srale made it impossible to prove actual notice.
Cuthbert and Lowe had knowledge of all of the facts
relating to the stock certificate and were legal counsel
for Migliaccios and the good friend of the plaintiff N"oke~-;.
It was testified that they did not inform X okes of any
defect in relation to the stock prior to the transfer, but
within two hours thereafter informed plaintiff of the
dispute relating to the stock. It seems indisputable that
Cuthbert and Lowe were acting as the agent of both
parties, giving their friend an opportunity to buy valuable stock and making it possible for their client to get
rid of what ultilnately proved to be an adverse lawsuit.
If knowledge of defects were not nnputed to the plaintiff under the fact situation, it is inconceivable what manner of situation 1nust be created to in1pute knowledge.
The rule is stated in An1erican Jurisprudence as follows:
"X otice given to an agent en1ployed to purchase property. of any defect in the title to, or
quality of the property, is notice to his principal,
in any controversy between hun and the vendor
in relation to such property. Accordingly, it is
('V<'r~·where conceded that a purchaser is bound
and affected by the knowledge or notice of an
agent purchasing the property of prior liens,
trn~t~. or frnnds, which knowledge or notice the
agPnt obtains in negotiating the particular transnetion. The p;PnPrnl rule is also applied as to notieP, aeqnin•d hy the ng()nt. of one who claims to
lw a bona fide purchaser." ~ Am. Jur .. Section
:rn . p.agp :291.
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POINT III.
THE SALE WAS NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH.

In spite of the difficulty relating to proof of actual
notice, it is the contention of the defendant that the plaintiff was not a purchaser in good faith. The court made
the finding that there were no facts adduced that, by
reasonable diligence, plaintiff should have known of any
adverse claim. The promise of fantastic profits in uranium stock, not traded, should have been a warning to
any purchaser. In this case the plaintiff testified that
he knew that the stock was not traded on the market and,
in spite of the representation that he could purchase for
$500.00 stock having a hook value of over $7000.00, the
court found that there was no circumstance that would
put plaintiff on notice of a defect.
Good faith has been the subject of many definitions
but it universally encompasses an honest intent, an absence of malice or design to defraud or seek unconscionable advantage. It has also been said that to constitute
good faith there must not only be an absence, not alone
of participation in the fraud or collusion with the vendor,
but also of knowledge or even notice of the fraud or of
facts and circumstances calculated to put an ordinarily
prudent business man on inquiry so that he would ascertain the truth.
"To constitute 'good faith', there must not
only be an absence, not alone of participation in
the fraud or collusion with the vendee, but also of
knowledge or even notice of the fraud, or of facts
and circumstances calculated to put an ordinarily
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prudent businessman on inquiry, so that he would
ascertain the truth. Thus, where it appeared that
a purchaser of stock had suspicions relating to
the sale of it, he cannot be said to be a purchaser
in good faith. Siano v. Helvering, D. C. N. J.,
13 F. Supp. 776, 780." Words and Plvrases, Vol.
18, page 495.
Fr01n the record it would appear that the plaintiff
was an ordinarily prudent business man. His employment would indicate at least that, and, while being a lawyer might negative the idea of business judgment, it does
not appear in the record that he claimed any such infirmity.
While the defendant herein is faced with the finding
as to notice, it is more fortunate on the question of good
faith. X o finding was made to the effect that the plaintiff was a purchaser in good faith. It would seem strange,
under the circumstances, that the plaintiff should not be
charged with at least making the nominal effort of a
local telephone call to inquire about the stock. If the
conduct of plaintiff wrrs not for the purpose of colluding to gain an unconscionable advantage, why such a calculated effort to talk about everything except the wrong
things. "rh~· wa~ it neeessar:· for Cuthbert to adjourn
to another office to call )[ igliaccio and why didn't he
inforin plaintiff of the conversation. In response to the
qtwstion wh:· he (li(ln•t tell Xokes about the conversation
with l\l igliaeeio. Cuthbert answ·ered: .. I didn•t believe
thPr<' wa~ nn:,thing wrong with the stoek. ·· (R. 49).
BPe.ansP Cuthbert did not telJ Xnkes about his conYPr~atioll with l\1 igliaccio for the reason that he didn't
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believe there was anything wrong with the stock, he was
asked if his statement to Migliaccio "that it was a sure
bet he wouldn't be able to do anything with that stock
without litigation" was the truth. l-Ie .answered that it
was. If one is to take the answers as the truth, the only
result is a calculated atte1npt by Cuthbert and Lowe to
seek an unconsciomible advantage in which the plaintiff
must be regarded .as a participant.
POINT IV.
THAT BY STATUTE THE TRANSFER WAS NOT VALID
AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION UNTIL IT WAS REGISTERED UPON THE BOOKS OF THE CORPORATION.

As has been previously noted above, the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act is a procedural device and does not
change the nature of the stockholders' ownership or
rights so far as the corporation is concerned. Cntcrmyer
et al v. State Ta.r Commission et al., supra.
The defendant takes the position that the transfer
from Migliaccio to Nokes did not bind the corporation
until such time as the transfer was registered on rthe
books of the corporation. Rection 1617, Ne1'wla CoJ/1piled Laws 1929 as amended, provides:

"* * * No transfer of stoek shall be valid
against the corporation until it shall have been
registered upon the books of the corporation."
epon presentation of the stock eertificate to the J>rpsident of the eorporation plaintiff \\~as informed of the
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corporation'~

clairn. The plaintiff had acquired no rights
as against the corporation at the time plaintiff w.as informed of its claim. The refusal to transfer was the only
method by which the corporation could protect its rights
and the rights of other stockholders, and upon the refusal
to transfer the plaintiff was left with an adequate remedy
against his transferor and, by reason of the statute, had
no right to con1pel the corporation to make the transfer.
Any other construction would leave the corporation and
the stockholders with a right but no remedy to safeguard
its interests. The corporation's rights could be defeated
hy successive transfers. The above statute has been construed by b\·o XeYada cases, Bereich t·. JJarye, 9 Xe,·.
316, and Double 0 Jlining Co. 1:. Simrak_. 132 P. :2d 605.
The latter c.ase held:
•·A transfer of stock between individuals, in
order to receiYe recognition by the corporation,
n1ust be registered upon its books: however, if
not so registered, the transfer is binding upon the
parties, and the equitable title, at least, passes.
Further, as between individuals, a registration
upon the corporate books n1ust be n1ade in order
that the transferee maY be entitled to exercise
voting po\n'r. In re ..-\.1:gns Printing Co .. 1 X.D.
-t:~-t. -t~ X."T· :-3-t/, 1~ L.H.~~. ISl. ~6 ~~m. St. Rep.
639, ()-t/: ~Tt•rrhants Xational Bank Y. \Yehrmann,
~0~ l ·.s. :2~)5, :2G S. Ct. ()1;-L 50 L. Ed. 1036, 1040;
G Fleteher, Corp .. 6339, Section 3796 and n. 19."

A :-;imilnr Cnlifornia statute has been construed in Realtp
& llclmildinp Co. r. Rca et al. (Cal.), :2~-! P. 1020:
"The general rule is that a transferor is not
released frOin thh~ unposed burden until his transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fer is duly registered upon the corporate books.
Our Code provides in substance thaA; a transfer
is not valid, except as to the parties thereto, until
the same is entered upon the books of the corporation so as to show the name of the parties by
whom and to whom the transfer was made, the
number of the certificate, the number of designation of the shares, and the date of the trransfer.
Civ. Code, Sec. 324. This statute is mandatory,
and not directory, and is not a mere rule for
guidance of the corporation and stockholder. The
section Inakes the transfer invalid, except as between the parties thereto, unless it is made in
conformity with this statutory requirement. The
transfer of shares of stock, therefore to become
effectual between transferor and creditors of the
corporation, must be entered on the corporate
books. Spreckels v. Nevada Bank, 113 Cal. 272,
45 Pac. 329, 33 L.R.A. 459, 54 Am. St. Rep. 348.
A provision of this character is .a formality intended for the protection and security of the corporation and of third persons dealing with the
same. Creditors of a corporation have a right
to rely upon the books as showing who the stockholders are and the amount of stock held by each,
and failure to m.ake a transfer on the books of
the corporation requires that such transfer must
be disregarded in considering the rights of creditors. Sherman v. S.K.D. Oil Co., 185 Cal. 534,
548, 197 Pac. 799 and cases cited."
It is also of importance to note that the request for

transfer was made to :Jfr. Frawley. There is no evidencPin the record that it was made in the office of the defendant corporation, and the plaintiff testified that he
did not present the stock certificate to the Transfer
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Agent. The books of the defendant corporation are by
law required to be at its principal place of business in
Nevada, the only place where the transfer could lawfully
be made.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment should
be reversed.

GUSTIN, RICHARDS, hl.ATTSSOK
& EVANS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Appellants
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